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Abstract 
Feelings and emotions, typically non-propositional, play an important part in the eventual quality 
of the interpretations to which they are attached. However, relevance theory has preferred to focus on 
how hearers build up propositions that fill the gap between what is meant and what is eventually inter-
preted (Carston 2002). These are easier to handle, possess a mental representation and are a genuine ob-
ject of analysis for linguistics (Chapman 2001, García-Carpintero 2010, Moeschler 2009). In this paper, 
a review is provided of several ways in which feelings and emotions play an important part in the even-
tual quality of interpretations, specifically focusing on irony (Yus 2016a, 2016b) and Internet-mediated 
communication (Yus 2016c, forthcoming). 
Keywords: feelings, emotions, non-propositional effects, irony comprehension, Internet-mediated 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Pragmatics deals with intentionally conveyed information; relevance theory (hence-
forth RT) further specifies its scope by claiming that it deals with ostensive-inferential 
communication, the one in which the communicator produces a stimulus which makes 
it mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the communicator intends, by 
means of this stimulus, to convey to the audience some information (Sperber and Wil-
son 1995: 63). As such, it mainly focuses on propositional information. Cases of non-ver-
bal ostension are also treated as producing propositional implications, even if somewhat 
vague. This paper underlines the importance of feelings and emotions for communica-
tion and eventual relevance, both when intended in parallel to propositionally conveyed 
information (affective attitude) and when these leak, as it were, from the act of com-
munication beyond the speaker’s awareness and overt intentionality. The paper is orga-
nised as follows. Firstly, a brief introduction is provided of what may be communicated 
according to RT. Secondly, some comments on non-propositional feelings and emotions 
and their importance in communication are provided. Finally, two exemplifying cases 
are briefly commented upon: irony comprehension and online identity. 
2. RELEVANCE THEORY AND PROPOSITIONAL COMMUNICATION 
The prototypical form of communication according to RT is the propositional one, 
and what is inferred is either an explicit proposition (explicature) or an implicated one 
(implicature) or both. As Sperber and Wilson (1995: 57) explain, there is a very good 
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reason to assume that what is communicated is propositional: it is relatively easy to say 
what propositions are, and how inference might operate over propositions. No one has 
any clear idea how inference might operate over non-propositional objects: say, emotions. 
“Propositional contents and attitudes thus seem to provide the only relatively solid ground 
on which to base a partly or wholly inferential approach to communication”. However, 
these authors do acknowledge that some effects of communication do not fall neatly into 
the propositional mould and, in fact, they claim that it is a mistake to focus only on pro-
positional communication, since there is a continuum of cases, from utterly intended ex-
plicatures and implicatures to implicatures which are merely made manifest, and to fur-
ther modification of the mutual cognitive environment of speaker and hearer in which 
what is conveyed is, rather, rich, and not entirely foreseeable cognitive effects (p. 201; 
see also Sperber and Wilson 2015: 121). 
Explicatures differ from the information coded, and interpretations may be more 
or less explicit. This departure from coded meaning is even more evident in the case of 
implicatures, which may also be arranged on a continuum between strong and weak. 
Consider this example (adapted from Carston 2009): 
(1)  Tom: How was the party? Did it go well? 
  Ann: There wasn’t enough drink and everyone left early. 
(2) a. There wasn’t enough alcoholic drink to satisfy the people at the party and so every-
one who came to the party left it early, roughly before 2 o’clock. 
 b. The party did not go well at all. 
 c. Parties in which alcohol is scarce and people leave early are not good. 
 d. Ann thinks alcohol is essential in parties. 
 e. Ann only enjoys herself at parties when she is surrounded by many people. 
When Tom interprets Ann’s utterance, he decodes her words and enriches them 
at the explicit level: the concept drink is adjusted into alcoholic drink; the scope of every-
one is narrowed to “everyone at the party”, and early has to be interpreted as the time 
in Tom and Ann’s culture in which leaving a party at a certain time is considered early. 
The resulting proposition could roughly be the explicature in (2a). Of course, as an ans-
wer, she also strongly implicates (2b) (an implicated conclusion), in the sense that it is 
clear that she backs up this implicature. This is obtained by pairing the explicature in (2a) 
with encyclopaedic information about what it takes for parties to be successful (the im-
plicated premise in (2c)). However, Tom may also derive further implicatures, this time 
weaker (Ann probably did not intend to communicate them, but these are anyhow trig-
gered by her utterance), such as (2d) or even weaker ones such as (2e), this time derived 
by Tom’s sole responsibility. 
3. AFFECTIVE ATTITUDE: FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS 
What about the communication of feelings and emotions or the speaker’s overall 
affective attitude? These are utterly important and may alter radically the eventual inter-
pretation obtained and the relevance yielded by the act of communication. Feelings and 
emotions are treated here as roughly similar, although there is no agreement on the scope 
or overlapping between them (Caffi and Janney 1994: 327). The latter are typically as-
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sociated with acute and intense reactions to one’s environment, often accompanied by 
physiological changes (Kidron and Kuzar 2002: 130), whereas the former seem to exhibit 
more stability. Affect seems to be an umbrella term for a whole range of feelings, moods 
and emotions (van Kleef 2016: 4). Similarly, Schwarz (2015: 161) differentiates between 
emotions and feelings, claiming that it is important to draw a distinction between them. 
Emotions would be defined as “a complex, internally represented knowledge system 
having a primarily evaluative function within the human organism.” On the other hand, 
feelings would belong to the dimension of emotion that is experienced consciously. 
These are, therefore, mental representations. 
4. PRAGMATICS AND NONPROPOSITIONAL INFORMATION 
As it has been argued in this paper, although pragmatics typically addresses inten-
tionally conveyed propositional communication, non-propositional information (both 
intentionally and unintendedly transmitted) is also essential to determine the full extent 
of the addresser’s intended interpretation and the quality of the addressee’s eventual 
interpretation. Gibbs et al. (2002: 128) also comment that, in many cases of interper-
sonal communication, what is important is not the explicit propositions stated, but the 
more indeterminate non-propositional meaning and affect that is expressed and under-
stood in the act of communication. In this way, propositional and non-propositional ef-
fects are intertwined. For instance, non-propositional effects may trigger or block propo-
sitional interpretations, and the latter can have an effect on the inference of non-propo-
sitional effects (Moeschler 2009: 460). 
The range of communicative possibilities involving feelings and emotions, which 
can be grouped under the umbrella terms affective attitude (when intentional) and affec-
tive effect (when “exuded” unintentionally), are varied if we take into account axes such 
as propositional/non-propositional quality or acted upon/non-acted upon, together with 
the initial distinction between intentional and unintentional transfer of affective infor-
mation. The term “acted upon” refers to the fact that feelings and emotions may be pro-
duced without the individual intervening in its extent and intensity, whereas on other 
occasions he/she does exert a control on their production. As Langlotz and Locher 
(2013: 91) summarize, while some cues may result from spontaneous expressions of 
genuine emotional states, other cues may be used strategically to emotionalize a given 
message in the absence of actual arousal. This entails degrees of control on this continu-
um from spontaneous to strategic emotional display. Van Kleef (2016: 57) adds that 
people express emotions to various degrees. At one end, experienced emotions which 
are expressed in an uncensored way, so that the interlocutor gets full insight into the 
individual’s feelings. At the other end, suppressed expression of any experienced 
emotion, to the extent that their nonverbal or verbal expressions provide no clues as to 
their internal feeling states. And Wilson and Wharton (2006) illustrate this continuum 
of cases as follows: “A speaker’s tiredness, boredom, frustration or anger may be re-
vealed by her tone of voice or facial expression, even though she is trying to conceal 
them and even though it is clear to the audience that they are being accidentally revealed 
rather than intentionally conveyed. In more sophisticated cases, a speaker may covertly 
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manipulate her tone of voice to suggest to an audience that she is accidentally betray-
ing her feelings rather than wanting them to be recognised as part of her meaning”. 
Initially, if we take into account these axes, several possibilities may be listed: 
1. Intentional/propositional. The addresser intentionally produces a propositional 
message whose content conveys his/her affective attitude. 
2. Intentional/non-propositional/acted upon. The addresser intentionally conveys 
affective information non-propositionally, either nonverbally (gestures, vocal expres-
sions) or attached to a verbal proposition (via intonation, gestures in parallel to verbal 
communication, etc.). Being aware of the affective information that should be conveyed, 
he/she acts upon this non-propositional act by enhancing it, reducing it, masking it, etc. 
3. Intentional/non-propositional/not acted upon. The addresser intentionally con-
veys affective information non-propositionally, either nonverbally or attached to a ver-
bal proposition. However, he/she does not feel the need to act upon this non-propositional 
act by enhancing it, masking it, etc. 
4. Unintentional/non-propositional/acted upon. Beyond the addresser’s intentions, 
some information exudes or leaks from him/her conveying his/her feelings or emotions. 
The addresser becomes aware of this leakage and acts upon its production by minimising 
it, masking it, etc. 
5. Unintentional/non-propositional/not acted upon. Beyond the addresser’s inten-
tions, some information exudes or leaks conveying his/her feelings or emotions. The ad-
dresser does not feel the need to act upon its production, by minimising it, masking it, etc. 
Among the aforementioned possibilities, one deserves further attention: the pro-
positional vs. non-propositional information communicated by these feelings and emo-
tions, either when attached to an utterance or when they are the only source of informa-
tion (e.g. nonverbal behaviour). For RT, if these are intended, they typically entail 
a propositional quality, even if what is communicated is a range of impressions, rather 
than a fully-fledged proposition. An often cited example is the following (Sperber and 
Wilson 1995: 55): 
(3) Mary and Peter arrive at the seaside. She opens the window overlooking the sea and 
sniffs appreciatively and ostensively. When Peter follows suit, there is no one particular 
good thing that comes to his attention: the air smells fresh, (...) it reminds him of their 
previous holidays, he can smell the sea (...); all sorts of pleasant things come to mind, 
and while, because her sniff was appreciative, he is reasonably safe in assuming that 
she must have intended him to notice at least some of them, he is unlikely to be able 
to pin her intentions down any further. 
In this case, Mary’s informative intention when sniffing the seaside air might be 
a number of assumptions that suddenly come to her mind upon sniffing, without neces-
sarily intending, in a conscious way, to communicate any particular one of these assump-
tions. Maybe all that she wants is to share an impression with Peter. As such, it is partly 
precise and partly vague, and may be communicated as a weak implicature. But perhaps 
all that takes place in (3) is a mutuality of sub-propositional feelings and emotions trig-
gered by the seaside, Mary perhaps being unable to pin them down propositionally and 
Peter being unable to infer beyond a general “she feels good about being at the seaside”. 
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In short, there would be a continuum of cases in emotional communication ranging from 
cases in which it is propositionally conveyed (explicitly, strongly implicated, weakly 
implicated) to cases in which what is conveyed and inferred remains at a sub-proposi-
tional level. 
Furthermore, there is no reason why some non-propositional affective informa-
tion could not be communicated besides (or even instead of) impression-related propo-
sitional implications. Illustrative examples are found in Strey (2016: 80), adapted as (4) 
below, and (5) from Wharton (2016): 
(4) a.  Jack: Let’s go to the mall. 
  Mary: (angrily) I’m feeling tired. 
 b. Mary feels tired. 
 c. Mary will not go to the mall. 
 d. When Mary is tired she never wants to go to malls. 
 e. Mary thinks that malls are crowded this time of year. 
 f. Mary feels angry at the prospect of having to go the mall. 
(5) a. A: How’s work going? 
  B: The boss is a bastard! 
 b. A: How’s work going? 
  B: (Sighs wearily). 
In the conversation (4a), Mary communicates (4b) explicitly (explicature). She also 
strongly implicates (4c), whereas other weaker implicatures such as (4d-e) are also trig-
gered by Mary’s utterance but may not be intended but extracted by Jack’s sole respon-
sibility. Crucially, Mary also communicates how she feels about Jack’s question (the 
affective attitude in 4f) by using a marked intonation and one of Jack’s relevance-oriented 
inferential strategies will focus on working out the extent and intensity of these negative 
feelings, which will influence the inference of the propositional content to which Mary’s 
intonation is attached (see also Moeschler 2009: 456—457). 
Similarly, Wharton (2016) is right in pointing out that the difference between (5a) 
and (5b) is covered within RT by distinguishing strong from weak communication, and 
in parallel between strong and weak implicatures. Needless to say, a conclusion is strong-
ly implicated to the extent that it must be derived in the course of constructing a satis-
factory interpretation (and its derivation is clearly intended and backed up by the speaker). 
In this case, there is mainly a single, strongly manifest (i.e. implicated), assumption. 
In the case of weakly implicated assumptions, these help with the construction of a satis-
factory interpretation, but are not essential or are even derived beyond the speaker’s 
intentions. For Wharton, (5a) quite strongly implicates that all is not well at work, whereas 
the sigh in (5b) makes weakly manifest a wide array of weak implicatures, that is, 
it creates an impression rather than conveying a definite message. Again, in my opinion 
it is reductive to base all interpretations, including impressions, on a propositional mould, 
even if a whole range of possibilities are covered between strongly and weakly implicated 
assumptions. Although B may well have a propositional implication in mind, he/she may 
also hold a rather general feeling located on the negative side (being upset, fed up, 
angry...) and may only be capable of communicating these broad non-propositional feel-
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ings, and not a mentally represented implicated propositional assumption, even if it is 
an impression-based weak implicature. And the same applies to the addressee, who may 
be able to stand on B’s shoes, as it were, to feel roughly the same broad negative feeling 
held by B, but without consciously reaching a propositional (even if weak) implicature. 
5. TWO CASE STUDIES 
Communication is partly propositional and partly non-propositional. Some infor-
mation is propositional and intended, of an explicit (explicature) and/or implicit (im-
plicature) quality. Some propositional information may also be derived beyond 
the speaker’s intentions, but it is nevertheless triggered by his/her act of communication. 
Similarly, non-propositional information may be intended (e.g. to make sure that the in-
terlocutor grasps how happy, angry etc. the addresser is), and some non-propositional 
information may also leak from the addresser’s act of communication beyond his/her 
intentions, with some interesting communicative outcomes. 
To account for this variability, in latest research (Yus 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2016b, 
2017), an extension of the RT model has been proposed by including the analysis of con-
textual constraints and non-intended non-propositional effects. The former were initially 
intended to account for the fact that Internet communication is affected by a number 
of interface-related and user-related qualities that may also alter the eventual relevance 
of the act of communication. These are mainly related to the users’ management of the 
interface, the kind of relationship existing between interlocutors, the user’s personality, 
etc. The term contextual constraint is restricted to aspects that underlie the acts of com-
munication and the users’ interactions (i.e. they exist prior to the interpretive activity) 
and constrain their eventual (un)successful outcome. They frame, as it were, communi-
cation and have an impact not only on the quality of interpretation, but also on the will-
ingness to engage in sustained virtual interactions. Constraints have an impact on (a) how 
much discourse is produced; (b) what kind of discourse is produced; (c) what kind of dis-
course is expected (audience validation); (d) what kind of discourse is possible (interface 
affordances); and (e) what kind of site is preferred (to channel communicative needs). 
Secondly, the term non-intended non-propositional effect refers to feelings, emo-
tions, impressions, etc. which are not overtly intended by the “sender user”, but are never-
theless generated from the act of communication, and add (positively or negatively) to 
the cognitive effects derived from the interpretation of propositional content. These ef-
fects are important for eventual relevance, since they have an impact (a) on the posi-
tive/negative outcome of Internet acts of communication; (b) on the preference for a spe-
cific site, medium or channel; (c) on why certain interactions are (un)profitable despite 
the lack of/existence of interesting information; and (d) on how Internet interactions 
make users feel. 
In short, the extended RT model would cover a broad range of communicated and/or 
inferred information: speaker-supported propositional content (explicatures, strong im-
plicatures, propositional attitudes, some weak implicatures), hearer-supported weak im-
plicatures (often beyond speaker’s overt intentions), speaker-supported non-propositional 
feelings and emotions (affective attitude), and hearer-supported feelings and emotions 
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beyond the speaker’s intentions (affective effects), that is, non-intended non-propositional 
effects generated beyond the act of communication but which affect eventual relevance. 
Among other research areas focusing on the importance of non-propositional infor-
mation (e.g. feelings and emotions), either intended or unintendedly leaked, two exam-
ples are briefly commented upon below: irony comprehension and online identity. In the 
former, the addresser’s affective attitude (feelings, emotions...) is important because it 
is intended and has to be recovered by the addressee as part of the relevant interpretive 
outcome. In the case of online identity, feelings and emotions are also important, but 
often because they are generated beyond the addresser’s communicative intentions. 
5.1. Irony comprehension 
Beyond the traditional (and often inaccurate) approach to irony as communicating 
the opposite of what is literally stated, RT focuses on the fact that irony necessarily needs 
an opinion, norm, thought or utterance (called echo) to which a dissociative attitude is 
held. The recovery of an ironic interpretation depends, apart from a recognition of the 
utterance as echoic, on an identification of the source of the opinion echoed and 
on a recognition that the speaker’s attitude to the opinion echoed is one of rejection or 
disapproval (dissociative attitude). In Yus (2016a) an example is cited: someone is in-
viting a friend to go to the beach and insisting that the weather is going to be fine, and 
upon arriving at the beach it stars pouring down. By saying “Nice weather we’re having!” 
the speaker does not want to assert that it is inappropriate to say that the weather is fine 
when it is actually pouring down, but to dissociate himself/herself from his/her friend’s 
opinion (and previous utterance) that the weather would be fine and that there was no 
reason not to go to the beach. Indeed, ironies make little sense if this attitude is not spot-
ted, the interest lying, rather, in the speaker’s attitude to an echoed thought or opinion. 
Besides the speaker’s dissociative attitude, a necessary element of irony is the need 
of a source for the echo. In short, the thought involved in ironic communication must be 
attributed to some actual person, or the speaker in a different context or humans in gen-
eral, so that the underlying attitude is clearly ascribable as dissociative and not as that 
of endorsement or support. The notion of echo is intentionally broad, since it covers 
direct echoes of previous utterances, and also echoes of attributed thoughts (real or imag-
inary), social norms and expectations. 
Sperber and Wilson (1995: 239—240) exemplify this need of an echo with Mary’s 
comment in (6), which obviously aims to communicate (7), but whose main point is ra-
ther to communicate irony-related implicatures such as the ones listed in (8) (adapted 
and extended in Yus 2016a), all of which demand from Peter the identification of the 
utterance as echoic (and Mary’s attitude involved as dissociative): 
(6) Peter: It’s a lovely day for a picnic. 
 [They go for a picnic and it rains]. 
 Mary [sarcastically]: It’s a lovely day for a picnic, indeed. 
(7) Mary manifestly believes that it is not a lovely day for a picnic. 
(8) It was wrong of Peter to say that it was a lovely day for a picnic. 
 Peter’s judgement has been unsound. 
 It was Peter’s fault that their day has been ruined. 
 Mary should never have trusted Peter in his weather prediction. 
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However, an appropriate account of irony entails not only the identification of echo 
and attitude, but also the identification of the speaker’s feelings and emotions (under 
the broad label of affective attitude) toward the source of the echo. Ironical interpretations 
differ radically depending on what affective attitude is held by the speaker when utter-
ing the irony, which may not only influence the eventual choice of an interpretation, but 
also the ascription of irony as utterly offensive, mildly offensive, praising or humorous. 
In a nutshell, being aware of the speaker’s feelings and emotions can make inter-
pretations differ radically. This view is more realistic in pairing propositional content 
(explicit, implicated, propositional attitude) with feeling- and emotion-related non-pro-
positional effects (affective attitude) whose relevance lies in a certain mutuality, rather 
than a specific interpretation and which are also relevant even if not propositional. An ex-
ample of how affective attitudes impact the propositional ironical interpretation is pro-
posed in Yus (2016a). With the same initial part of a phone conversation in (9), the identi-
fication of the speaker’s affective attitude (feelings, emotions) yields the different dia-
logue continuations and differing interpretive outcomes listed in (10), (11) and (12). 
The exchange in (9—10) is a real phone conversation, while (11—12) are my proposal 
of alternative continuations: 
(9) [John calls Mary on the phone]. 
 Mary: Hi John! How’re things? 
 John: I am fine! I’ve just thought... Since Mary is always calling me, today 
for a change I’ll make the call. 
(10) Mary: Hahaha. Poor thing... You are right, I should call you more often, but you 
seem soooo happy to call your friend, don’t you? hahaha. 
 John:  Hehehe... Of course, Mary... A pleasure. 
(11) Mary: I am sorry... I do call you every now and then... Don’t be so angry. 
 John: Yeah, once a year more or less. I just think I deserve better. 
(12) Mary: Hahaha. Poor thing... You are right, I should call you more often, but you 
seem soooo happy to call your friend, don’t you? hahaha. 
 John: Actually, I am pissed off with having to call you all the time. You could 
make the effort to call me, couldn’t you? 
 Mary: Oh... I am sorry... Don’t be so angry. I never thought you’d be so upset. 
In these examples, John has a dissociative attitude towards an opinion echoed of 
a commonsense quality: that nobody should always be the one calling. However, alt-
hough the dissociative attitude is the same in (9—12), the final interpretation of this 
echoed opinion varies in each case because of the feelings associated with this opinion. 
In (10), John does think that it would be nice that Mary called him more often, but the 
feelings that he holds towards the echoed opinion are on the positive side, and Mary 
infers it correctly. By contrast, in (11) the feelings that he holds towards that opinion are 
on the negative side. Mary, again, correctly infers that the feelings associated with John’s 
affective attitude are on the negative side. Finally, in (12) the dissociative attitude is cor-
rectly inferred but the feelings or emotions associated with the opinion echoed (the affec-
tive attitude) are misinterpreted, resulting in an erroneous interactional outcome. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that what influences the eventual interpretation 
of an utterance is not only the identification of the speaker’s affective attitude, but also 
the current feelings and emotions held by the hearer upon inferring the propositional 
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content of the utterance. Very often, the same irony yields different interpretive outcomes 
because the hearer’s feelings and emotions frame this interpretation and may lead it to 
different inferential outcomes. 
Sperber and Wilson (1995: 240) do acknowledge the role of emotions in irony com-
prehension, stating that speakers use an echoic utterance to convey different attitudes 
and emotions “ranging from outright acceptance and endorsement to outright rejection 
and dissociation, and that the recognition of these attitudes and emotions may be crucial 
to the interpretation process”. These authors opt for a picture of continuum, with dif-
ferent blends of attitude and emotion giving rise to a whole range of borderline cases 
which do not fit neatly into any existing scheme. In my opinion, affective attitude as-
cription should be incorporated into the RT model of irony comprehension, together with 
dissociative attitude and source of the echo, and the goal of a cognitive pragmatics should 
be to provide an account of how this affective attitude is spotted and how it influences 
the comprehension of the propositional content. And this is particularly noticeable in the 
case of ironical communication. Akimoto et al. (2014: 1168) are right in remarking that 
“verbal irony implies an underlying emotional attitude that differs from the meaning 
of what is actually said. Comprehension of irony is a representative example of the high-
order sociolinguistic abilities of humans. It goes beyond literal understanding, integrating 
various types of information from the social context, including events, the speaker’s 
beliefs and emotional attitudes, and paralinguistic cues such as facial expression. (...) 
Affective aspects are also important because they are not only involved in the processing 
of emotional interpretive cues, but are also closely related to the social function of irony, 
which is the reason why irony is used”. 
5.2. Online identity 
Relevance is a comparative notion. Human cognition is capable, on every occasion, 
of assessing the cognitive effects and mental effort of competing propositional interpre-
tations and automatically opt for the most relevant one in a specific context. However, 
relevance is also variable and subject to contextual features. As has been argued above, 
the eventual relevance may be affected by a number of factors that alter the intended 
relevance of an input even before it is produced (contextual constraints). Besides, ad-
dressees may find relevance in some inferred information that “leaks” beyond the propo-
sitional interpretation intended by the speaker (non-intended non-propositional effects). 
Needless to say, both non-propositional effects and contextual constraints exist in every 
act of communication, not only in Internet-mediated ones, but their influence is much 
more noticeable on the Internet, where interactions are often devoid of physical co-pre-
sence and typed utterances often exhibit a cues-filtered quality (Yus 2011, 2014, 2015a, 
2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2016d, 2016e, 2017). 
Concerning online identity, by means of different types of uploaded (verbal-vi-
sual-multimodal) discourse, users position themselves as unique individuals and upload 
content on their profiles with expected audiences and interpretations, a kind of identity 
performance; and thanks to the affordances of new media, “addressee users” also co-
construct, co-produce text in a joint generation of content. This is particularly useful for 
identity-shaping strategies, since users manage and shape their personal identities with 
the aid of uploaded content and the impact that this content has on friends and acquaint-
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ances in terms of verbal replies, non-verbal reactions, etc., constituting a very relevant 
source of information for users beyond the objective information communicated by this 
self-related content. These constitute the main focus of analysis of a cyberpragmatics 
of online identity, since these are intentional acts of communication with intended (and 
expected) interpretations. 
However, as has been argued in Yus (forthcoming), if we base the eventual rele-
vance of Internet-mediated acts of communication only on the objective interest and 
value aroused by the intentional propositional content uploaded and transferred to other 
users, we will be unable to explain much of the appeal and the specificity of the Net 
in terms of user satisfaction and engagement (and eventual impact on the user’s self-
image). The aforementioned additional terminology aims to complement propositional 
relevance so that a valid explanation of user (dis)satisfaction with online interactions 
may be provided. Certainly, users often do not only obtain relevance from the informa-
tion provided by the content itself, but also (and nowadays especially) from the feelings 
and emotions that this content produces in addressee users, often beyond the interlocu-
tors’ awareness. The kind of effect that is important in this case is the one which ex-
hibits a non-intentional and non-propositional quality, sometimes adding to the relevance 
of the propositional information and, crucially, often making up for the objective irrele-
vance of the information contained in the discourse communicated. 
The eventual relevance of Internet-mediated acts of communication may be affect-
ed by the user’s attributes and motivations, especially the user’s personality and its man-
agement in the online/offline interface. Users frequently present an enhanced version 
of their selves and the act of presentation, even if faithful to the user’s offline identity, 
is always constrained (qualitatively and quantitatively) by the user’s personality, self-
esteem, strength of ties, feelings and emotions. Besides, the user’s content uploaded is 
also constrained by general expectations of conformity to norms and group-related ex-
pectations. This is especially the case of young users, always eager to find ways to leave 
a positive impression on their audiences and in the process they are constantly moni-
toring what their peers expect from them. 
In the context of the topic of this paper, namely the role that feelings and emotions 
play in communication, non-intended non-propositional effects are important in the way 
they frequently hold the key to why Internet-mediated interactions turn out (ir)relevant 
regardless of the objective value of the content transferred to other users. Several of these 
effects have an impact of the user’s self-concept or overall sense of identity. Among 
others, in Yus (forthcoming) the following are listed: 
1. Feeling of connectedness, social awareness, feeling of being part of the inter-
actions and friendships. Many users engage in “chained” acts of communication (typi-
cally trivial ones) because they eventually obtain an awareness of friends and peers and 
a feeling of connectedness. The notion of ambient awareness (Thompson 2008) points 
in this direction, since it refers to mutual awareness of one another arising from non-
stop dialogues and uploaded content, often fragmentary, which nevertheless gives users 
a more or less thorough picture of their friends. 
2. Feeling of being noticed by the network of friends, by the user’s community, 
of feedback, of social support. Sustained interactions not only generate connectedness, 
but also feelings of in-group membership and communal support, of being “attached” 
to the other members of the group (Yus 2007). 
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3. Generation of social capital. The term refers broadly to the benefits we receive 
from our social relationships, the resources linked to membership in a group or network 
of relationships, facilitating actions among these members. In this sense, virtual inter-
actions aid in producing social capital that would otherwise be impossible if people 
only relied on physical co-presence for its generation. 
4. Feeling of increased mutuality of information among friends and acquaintances. 
According to RT, the goal of human communication is not so much the mere transfer 
of information to others, but to generate a mutuality of this information (a mutual mani-
festness, in its terminology). The mutual satisfaction at sharing may be itself a source 
of satisfaction beyond the objective quality of the information exchanged. 
5. Feeling of enhanced/decreased self-esteem and generation of positive/negative 
emotions. Finally, another positive/negative non-propositional effect has to do with self-
esteem as managed and shaped through virtual interactions. On the positive side, virtual 
interactions may increase self-esteem. On the negative side, the user may end up with 
an offset of negative effects that have an impact on the user’s self-esteem. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Non-propositional feelings and emotions are important in human communication, 
both when intended as part of the eventual interpretation (the addresser’s affective atti-
tude) and when leaked unintentionally from the act of communication (affective effects). 
In this paper two examples have been provided illustrating this importance, one regarding 
intentional communication (feelings and emotions conveyed in ironical communication) 
and one related to these unintended feeling- and emotion-related effects (affective ef-
fects impacting the user’s online identity). 
© Francisco Yus, 2018 
REFERENCES 
Akimoto, Y., Sugiura, M., Yomogida, Y., Miyauchi, C.M., Miyazawa, S. & Kawashima, R. (2014). 
Irony comprehension: Social conceptual knowledge and emotional response. Human Brain 
Mapping, 35, 1167—1178. doi: 10.1002/hbm.22242. 
Caffi, C. & Janney, R.W. (1994). Toward a pragmatics of emotive communication. Journal of Prag-
matics 22, 325—373. doi: 10.1016/0378-2166(94)90115-5. 
Carston, R. (2002). Thoughts and Utterances. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Carston, R. (2009). Explicit/implicit distinction. In Cummings, L. (ed.), The Pragmatics Encyclopedia. 
London: Routledge, 154—162. 
Chapman, S. (2001). In defence of a code: Linguistic meaning and propositionality in verbal com-
munication. Journal of Pragmatics 33, 1553—1570. doi: 10.1016/S0378-2166(01)00009-1. 
García-Carpintero, M. (2010). Linguistic meaning and propositional content. In Romero, E. & B. So-
ria (eds.), Explicit Communication: Robyn Carston’s Pragmatics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 75—91. 
Gibbs, R.W., Leggitt, J.S. & Turner, E.A. (2002). What’s special about figurative language in emo-
tional communication? In Fussell, S.R. (ed.), The Verbal Communication of Emotions. Inter-
disciplinary Perspectives. Mahwah: L.E.A., 125—149. 
Kidron, Y. & Kuzar, R. (2002). My face is paling against my will. Emotion and control in English 
and Hebrew. Pragmatics & Cognition, 10 (1/2), 129—157. doi: 10.1075/pc.10.12.07kid. 
Francisco Yus. Russian Journal of Linguistics, 2018, 22 (1), 94—107 
 105 
Langlotz, A. & Locher, M.A. (2013). The role of emotions in relational work. Journal of Pragmatics, 
58: 87—107. doi: 10.1016/j.pragma.2013.05.014. 
Moeschler, J. (2009). Pragmatics, propositional and non-propositional effects: Can a theory of utterance 
interpretation account for emotions in verbal communication? Social Science Information, 48 (3), 
447—464. doi: 10.1177/0539018409106200. 
Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (1995). Relevance. Communication and Cognition (2nd ed.). Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (2015). Beyond speaker’s meaning. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 
XV (44), 117—149. 
Schwarz-Friesel, M. (2015). Language and emotion. The cognitive linguistic perspective. In 
Lüdtke, U.M. (ed.), Emotion in Language. Theory — Research — Application. Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins, 157—173. 
Strey, C. (2016). The Language of Emotions: An Ostensive-Inferential Study. Ph.D Thesis. Porto 
Alegre: Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul. 
Thompson, C. (2008). Brave new world of digital intimacy. The New York Times, September 5th, 
Magazine. 
van Kleef, G.A. (2016). The Interpersonal Dynamics of Emotion. Toward an Integrative Theory 
of Emotions as Social Information. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wharton, T. (2016). That bloody so-and-so has retired: Expressives revisited. Lingua, 175—176, 
20—35. doi: 10.1016/j.lingua.2015.08.004. 
Wilson, D. & Wharton, T. (2006). Relevance and prosody. Journal of Pragmatics, 38(10), 1559—
1579. doi: 10.1016/j.pragma.2005.04.012. 
Yus, F. (2007). Virtualidades Reales. Nuevas Formas de Comunidad en la Era de Internet. Alicante: 
University of Alicante, Servicio de Publicaciones. 
Yus, F. (2011). Relevance equations of effective Internet communication. In Pennock, B. & Suau, F. 
(eds), Interdisciplinarity and languages. Current issues in Research, Teaching, Professional 
Applications and ICT. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 65—86. 
Yus, F. (2014). Turismo móvil: Discurso, interactividad y usabilidad en las ‘apps’ de turismo”. Paper 
delivered at Discurso y Géneros del Turismo 2.0. University of Valencia and IULMA, Valen-
cia, April. 
Yus, F. (2015a). Should relevance theory analyse what is non-propositional, non-intentional but yet 
affects the eventual relevance? Paper delivered at Relevance Round Table Meeting 4. Kraków: 
Institute of English Studies, Jagiellonian University of Kraków, September. 
Yus, F. (2015b). The discursive management of the phatic Internet (and how to explain it pragma-
tically). Paper delivered at Approaches to Digital Discourse Analysis (ADDA). Valencia (Spain), 
November. 
Yus, F. (2015c). Broadening the (propositional) scope of pragmatics in order to address the (non-
propositional) quality of humorous effects. Paper delivered at I Workshop on Advanced Studies 
of Humor and Gender (WASHUM). Alicante (Spain): University of Alicante, November. 
Yus, F. (2015d). The role of cognition and relevance in new digital narratives. In: Carpi, E. (ed.), Pros-
pettive Multilingue e Interdisciplinari nel Discorso Specialistico. Pisa: Pisa University Press, 
81—107. 
Yus, F. (2016a). Propositional attitude, affective attitude and irony comprehension. Pragmatics & 
Cognition, 23(1), 92—116. doi: 10.1075/pc.23.1.05yus. 
Yus, F. (2016b). Humour and Relevance. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
Франсиско Юс. Вестник РУДН. Серия: ЛИНГВИСТИКА. 2018. Т. 22. № 1. С. 94—107 
106 
Yus, F. (2016c). The phatic Internet. Networked feelings and emotions across the propositional-non-
propositional and the intentional-unintentional board. Paper delivered at the International Con-
ference on Language and Emotion. Madrid, November. 
Yus, F, (2016d). Towards a cyberpragmatics of mobile instant messaging. In: Romero-Trillo, J. (ed.), 
Yearbook of Corpus Linguistics and Pragmatics 2016: Global Implications for Culture and 
Society in the Networked Age. Berlin: Springer, 7—26. 
Yus, F. (2016e). La seducción de lo no codificado. In Beguelin, V. & Cordone, G. (eds.), Manifes-
taciones intermediales de la literatura hispánica del siglo XXI. Madrid: Visor, 33—53. 
Yus, F. (2017). Contextual constraints and non-propositional effects in WhatsApp communication. 
Journal of Pragmatics, 114, 66—86. doi: 10.1016/j.pragma.2017.04.003. 
Yus, F. (forthcoming) Relevance from and beyond propositions. The case of online identity. In 
Nasu, H. & Strassheim, J. (eds.), Relevance and Irrelevance: Theories, Fa. 
Article history: 
Received: 03 July 2017 
Revised: 20 July 2017 
Accepted: 25 July 2017 
For citation: 
Yus, Francisco (2018). Attaching Feelings and Emotions to Propositions. Some Insights on Irony 
and Internet Communication. Russian Journal of Linguistics, 22 (1), 94—107. doi 10.22363/2312-
9182-2018-22-1-94-107. 
Bionote: 
FRANCISCO YUS teaches pragmatics at the University of Alicante. He has a PhD in linguistics and 
he is full professor at the University of Alicante, Department of English Studies. Research interests: 
Pragmatics, Discourse Analysis, Media Discourse, Applied Linguistics, Sociolinguistics, Inter-
net communication, Linguistic Politeness, Humor, Irony, Misunderstandings. Contact information: 
francisco.yus@ua.es 
FINANCE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: 
This research was supported by the EMO-FUNDETT research project, a coordinate project awarded 
by the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (FFI2013-47792-C2-1-P). 
DOI: 10.22363/2312-9182-2018-22-1-94-107 
ВЫРАЖЕНИЕ ЧУВСТВ И ЭМОЦИЙ В ПРОПОЗИЦИИ: 
ВЗГЛЯД НА ИРОНИЮ И ИНТЕРНЕТКОММУНИКАЦИЮ 
Франсиско Юс 
Университет Аликанте 
Carretera San Vicente del Raspeig, s/n, 03690 San Vicente del Raspeig, 
Alicante, Испания 
Чувства и эмоции, обычно не связанные с пропозицией, играют большую роль в процессе ин-
терпретации того, к чему они относятся. Тем не менее, теория релевантности предпочтительно ак-
центирует внимание на том, как слушающие строят предположения, заполняющие разрыв между 
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тем, что имелось в виду, и что было понято (Carston 2002). Эти предположения обладают ментальной 
репрезентацией и являются объектом изучения лингвистов (Chapman 2001, García-Carpintero 2010, 
Moeschler 2009). Статья представляет собой обзор некоторых способов выражения чувств и эмоций, 
которые играют важную роль в интерпретации сказанного. Автор уделяет особенное внимание 
иронии (Yus 2016a, 2016b) и интернет-коммуникации (Yus 2016c, в печати). 
Ключевые слова: чувства, эмоции, понимание иронии, интернет-коммуникация, киберпраг-
матика, он-лайн идентичность 
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